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In our adversarial legal system, the common law is most often 
shaped by disputes involving parties that want different outcomes. 
Rarely do parties spend the time and resources to litigate because they 
want the same outcome. However, special education law involves such 
a common desire—providing students with disabilities an appropriate 
education.1 In this area, litigation often arises because of 
disagreements over what methods will best achieve that common 
desire, not over the ultimate outcome.  
In 1976, Congress enacted what is today the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act2  (IDEA) under its Spending Clause3 
powers. Its purpose is to provide students with disabilities a 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., Ohio State University. 
1 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006); Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. 
Ct. 2484, 2494 (2009). 
2 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1491 (2006). 
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meaningful education4  by requiring states receiving federal funding 
for special education to provide all eligible students with a “free and 
appropriate public education”5 (FAPE) in the “least restrictive 
environment”6 (LRE). Restrictiveness is defined as the degree to 
which the student with a disability interacts with others who do not 
have disabilities.7 These provisions standing alone, however, do not 
provide much guidance for the states or their school districts.  
Yet it is likely that Congress intended to use such generalized 
language because the IDEA’s focus is on individual students. The 
Supreme Court recognized that the IDEA requires states receiving 
federal assistance to educate children with many different kinds of 
disabilities.8 Moreover, benefits for one child “at one end of the 
spectrum will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at 
the other end, with infinite variations in between.”9 Because there is so 
much variance involved with the IDEA, Congress likely anticipated a 
high degree of litigation as parties disagreed over how the vague 
provisions applied to their individual situations. The dispute resolution 
process that the IDEA mandates also evidences this anticipation.10 The 
IDEA mandates mediation and the exhaustion of state-level 
administrative hearing processes prior to bringing action in federal 
court.11 These provisions, together with the IDEA’s focus on 
individual students, indicate that Congress intended the IDEA to be 
ambiguous.  
 When those disputes reach the judiciary, the courts of appeals 
have responded in different ways. Specifically, the appeals courts 
disagree over what constitutes an LRE. For instance, the Fifth Circuit 
engages in a two-part balancing test, asking whether a child can be 
                                                 
4 Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. High Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 
U.S. 176, 180 (1982). 
5 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
6 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006). 
7 Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Charles W., 81 F. App’x 843, 847 (5th Cir. 
2003). 
8 Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982). 
9 Id. 
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educated satisfactorily in a regular classroom, and if not, whether the 
child has been “mainstreamed”12 to the maximum extent 
appropriate.13 The Sixth Circuit’s test directs reviewing courts i
ambit to consider whether the supplementary services offered in a 









                                                
14 The Ninth Circuit’s test incorporates the Sixth 
Circuit’s approach into a four-factor test, requiring its lower courts to 
(1) compare the benefits in the general education environment with
those in the segregated setting; (2) consider the non-academic benef
of placement in the general education environment; (3) conside
impact of the student’s placement in the general education 
environment on the teacher and students without disabilities; and (4) 
consider the cost of the supplementary services that are needed for the 
student to be placed in the general education environment.15 The Thir
Circuit adopts the Fifth Circuit’s test and adds three factors to the first 
part of the test.16 The Seventh Circuit’s test asks whether the student 
with a disability received a satisfactory education in the ge
education environment, and if not, whether “reasonable measures” 
would have made it sat 17
The Department of Education’s regulations have fleshed out 
the LRE requirement to some extent. It requires for a “continuum” of 
arrangements that range from total inclusion in a general education 
classroom to placement in an institutional environment.18 The IDEA 
 
12 “Mainstreaming” is an educational term that refers to the placement of a 
student with a disability in a regular education environment with appropriate 
instructional support. Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Is the Era of Judicially-Ordered 
Inclusion Over? 114 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 1011, 1017 (1997). LRE is not 
synonymous with mainstreaming because placement in a regular education 
environment is inappropriate for some students with disabilities. Id.  
13 Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989). 
14 Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983). 
15 Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 
1400–01 (9th Cir. 1994). 
16 Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 
1204, 1217–18 (3d Cir. 1993). See discussion infra Part III.B. 
17 Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 277 
(7th Cir. 2007). See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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requires that school boards place students with disabilities in a setting 
that will involve as much interaction with nondisabled peers “to the 
maximum extent appropriate.”19 Yet how the appeals courts determine 
what placement on that continuum is most appropriate is accomplished 
in starkly different ways. 
 Though different appeals courts apply their own respective 
tests, there are essentially two types: factor-based tests and 
reasonableness tests. The majority of circuits employ a factor-based 
test, while only the Seventh Circuit employs a reasonableness test. 
Both purport to better realize congressional intent, yet the former 
requires the projection of judicial review into classrooms, while the 
latter is much more deferential and uses a less exacting form of 
scrutiny. Cases with similar facts, therefore, can reach different 
outcomes.20 This difference in outcomes, when based on the same 
facts, must mean that one of these tests is misapplying the substantive 
provisions of the IDEA. 
 This Note contends that the reasonableness test better achieves 
congressional intent. It compares the Seventh Circuit’s reasonableness 
test from Board of Education v. Ross21 with the Third Circuit’s factor 
test from Oberti v. Board of Education22.23 By examining the 
language of the IDEA and the limited Supreme Court precedent
has affected LRE interpretation, this Note argues for the abandonment
of the factor tests that intrusively scrutinize school board decisions an
the findings of state-level adjudicatory bodies set up under the IDEA. 
Courts should abandon the Oberti-type test because neither the 




                                                 
19 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
20 See infra Part IV. 
21 Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
22 Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 
1204, 1217–18 (3d Cir. 1993). 
23 Of the different factor tests, Oberti is the prime example because it has been 
credited with starting the “era” of judicial intrusion upon placement decisions by 
school boards. Osborne, Jr., supra note 12, at 1017. Therefore, it serves as a 
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presumes that a student with a disability should be included in a 
general education environment. In addition, this Note will examine a 
United States district court case applying the Third Circuit’s factor-
based test, and then will apply the Seventh Circuit’s reasonableness 
test to that case’s facts. By comparing the different outcomes, this 
Note argues that the outcome of the latter test better achieves 
congressional intent of providing all students with disabilities an 
education that is appropriate to their “unique needs,”24 especially in 
light of Supreme Court precedent and studies examining the effects on 
students with disabilities when they are misplaced in general education 
environments. 
 
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA 
 
Neither the federal government nor any state government 
provided meaningful educational service to disabled children until 
fairly recently. Before that time, people with disabilities were 
neglected and deprived of basic rights. In 1927, in the face of an equal 
protection challenge, the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell upheld a 
Virginia act providing for the sterilization of people with disabilities. 
25 The act recited “that the health of the patient and the welfare of 
society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of m
defectives.”
ental 
                                                
26 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes rationalized the 
holding: “ . . . [I]n order to prevent our being swamped with 
incompetence . . . [i]t is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to 
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind.”27 At least thirty states endorsed disparate 
 
24 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) (2006). 
25 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). While this case has not been overruled, such a 
statute probably would not withstand present constitutional muster. The Buck Court 
employed rational basis review. In light of Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 
316 U.S. 535 (1942), which recognized that procreation is a fundamental right, the 
statute at issue in Buck would fail strict scrutiny. 
26 Buck, 274 U.S. at 205. 
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treatment of people with disabilities, having at one time or another 
permitted their involuntary sterilization.28 That a majority of states has 
at one time or another provided for this constitutional violation 
indicates the hardship and prejudice that people with disabilities have 
faced during this nation’s history.  
 Another indication of this prejudice is that no state provided 
meaningful access to public schools until 1911, when New Jersey 
became the first state to provide special education classes.29 Before 
that, disabled children were largely left out of the educational 
environment entirely. During the nineteenth century, transportation to 
school was on horseback or on foot, imposing prohibitive hardships 
for those who were immobile or severely mentally disabled.30 Before 
the Civil War, “parents and officials often hid children” who would 
now be classified as entitled to special education services in “attics or 
poorhouses.”31 After the Civil War, many communities began 
adopting compulsory education laws.32 Those children who suffered 
from less severe disabilities than those who could not travel did gain 
some access to formal education.33 However, educators separated 
these children from the regular education environment, sometimes by 
creating separate classrooms or even separate schools.34 Such 
classification lacked any precision, and these students would be 
labeled simply as “deaf,” “feebleminded,” or “crippled.”35 
During the Progressive era, some cities began to recognize the 
educational needs of people with disabilities. Chicago, Boston, and 
                                                 
28 Center for Individual Freedom, 
http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/freedomline/current/in_our_opinion/un_sterile_past.html 
(last visited Apr. 28, 2010). 
29 Marcia Pearce Burgdorf & Robert Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal 
Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a “Suspect Class” Under 
the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855, 873 (1975). 
30 Id. at 871. 
31 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, 
AND AMERICAN LAW 29 (1990). 
32 Id. 
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Providence provided special classes for the mentally retarded in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.36 Yet accommodations 
did not improve much until the 1920s, with classrooms for the 
mentally disabled coming into existence.37 Even still, those who did 
not show any progress in those programs were deemed “uneducable” 
and excluded from public schooling.38 Lacking any individual 
assessments, determinations of whether to include or exclude a 
disabled child from public schooling were based on intelligence 
tests.39 Such overbroad, generalized mechanisms of assessment failed 
to appreciate the complex and unique needs of any particular student 
afflicted with a mental disability. 
 As recently as the 1960s, no state provided formal services for 
children with disabilities.40  Many states continued to exclude students 
with disabilities.41 Those that were included were often put in 
programs that were inappropriate for their respective needs.42 Students 
with physical disabilities were placed in programs with students who 
suffered from mental disabilities.43 In 1974, roughly one million 
children were entirely excluded from the public schools because of 
some disability.44 It was also estimated that of the nearly six million 
children who were disabled and were attending public schools, half 
were probably receiving no special education services.45 Parents of the 
disabled began to push their respective states to address this neglect 
and were met with some success.46 Responding to parents’ efforts, 
some states passed laws providing for partial funding and required 
                                                 




40 Edwin W. Martin et al., The Legislative and Litigation History of Special 




44 Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 789, 803 (2006). 
45 Id. 
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school boards to offer special educational services to children with 
disabilities.47 However, many laws were not enforced, or the funds 
themselves proved to be woefully insufficient.48  
 Because of the unresponsiveness of the states, parents turned to 
the federal courts and to Congress. Two landmark cases, one coming 
out of Pennsylvania and the other out of the District of Columbia, 
provided the basis for what would become the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act that we have today. The first, Pennsylvania 
Association for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, was 
initiated by PARC and the parents of thirteen mentally disabled 
children for the children’s exclusion from public schools.49 The 
plaintiffs argued that the denial of a public education to children with 
mental retardation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.50 They presented expert testimony to show 
that students with mental disabilities “are capable of benefiting from a 
program of education and training.”51 Because Pennsylvania had 
provided a free education, it could not deny students with disabilities 
access to a meaningful education.52 The plaintiffs submitted a consent 
agreement to which the state agreed.53 The agreement provided that 
“‘[e]very retarded person between the ages of six and twenty-one 
years . . . shall be provided access to a free public program of 
education and training appropriate to his capacities as soon as 
possible.’”54 The district court approved the agreement and adopted it 
as a decree, avoiding the constitutional question.55 This decree created 
the contours of the IDEA’s FAPE and LRE provisions. 
 In the other landmark case, from the District of Columbia, the 
district court reached the constitutional questions raised by the 
plaintiffs. In Mills v. Board of Education, the parents of poor minority 
                                                 
47 Id. at 28. 
48 Id. 
49 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
50 Id. at 1258; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
51 334 F. Supp. at 1259. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 1266. 
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students with mental disabilities brought a class action lawsuit against 
the Board of Education of the District of Columbia for denying them a 
free public education. 56 Citing Brown v. Board of Education I57 and 
Bolling v. Sharpe58, the district court rejected the Board of 
Education’s argument that it did not have sufficient funding to provide 
for disabled children.59 “Constitutional rights must be afforded 
citizens despite the greater exp 60ense involved.”   
                                                
 While Congress was prompted by these cases to pass 
legislation that would fundamentally change the public school 
environment, it had been involved with public schools before, albeit 
for reasons different from the preservation of constitutional rights. For 
instance, in 1958, Congress passed the National Defense Education 
Act (NDEA), in response to the Soviet Union’s outer space success 
with the launch of Sputnik-1 in September of 1957.61 NDEA sought to 
improve science and math aptitude in the elementary grades.62 This act 
began federal involvement in public schools at the elementary and 
secondary educational levels.63 But it was not until after PARC and 
Mills that Congress passed legislation that enforced the newly 
recognized rights to a free public education for students with 
disabilities.64 
 In 1965, Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA),65 the predecessor to the No Child Left Behind 
 
56 348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.D.C. 1972). 
57 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public schools 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
58 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (applying the Brown I rationale to the District of 
Columbia through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
59 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874–76.  
60 Id. at 876. 
61 Martin et al, supra note 40, at 26. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 548 U.S. 
176, 194 (1982). 
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Act (NCLB).66 This act was significant because it marked the first 
time that Congress directly subsidized services to specified classes of 
students.67 As part of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society 
policies, ESEA gave the federal government a new role in shaping 
educational policies.68 It was intended to compel school districts to 
treat “disadvantaged students” more equally.69 One scholar argues that 
the ESEA was a consequence of a “compensatory”70 federal 
government, where government officials enacted policies based on the 
understanding that “the state could manage the economy and mitigate 
the social outcomes of the market without directly intervening in the 
operation of the marketplace.”71 The Johnson administration saw the 
state as a tool for combating poverty, and it considered education as an 
important factor in whether one could overcome poverty.72 The ESEA 
was one of many different policies the administration wielded in its 
“war on poverty,” and combating that war was ESEA’s main 
purpose.73 Though the Act did not specify students with disabilities, 
the same Congress amended Title I of the ESEA to include them.74 
Title VI created an incentive for states to develop educational 
programs that benefited students with disabilities.75 However, it did 
                                                 
66 In 2002, Congress amended the ESEA and reauthorized it as the NCLB. 
NCLB imposes upon States greater accountability to meet state academic standards, 
gauged through state testing systems, that meet federal requirements. See, e.g., 
STATE OF WASHINGTON OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, 
http://www.k12.wa.us/esea/ (last visited April 28, 2010). 
67 Martin et al., supra note 40, at 27. 
68 Harvey Kantor, Education, Social Reform, and the State: ESEA and Federal 
Education Policy in the 1960s, 100 AM. J. EDUC. 47, 49 (1991). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 56. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 58. 
73 Id. at 60. 
74 Martin et al., supra note 40, at 27. 
75 School Vouchers and Students with Disabilities, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON 
DISABILITY, http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/pdf/vouchers.pdf (last 
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not include any specific mandates that would condition the receipt of 
funding.76  
 Five years later, Congress replaced the amendment with the 
Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA),77 which replaced Title VI 
of the ESEA.78 Like its predecessor, EHA did not specify how states 
had to spend federal funds.79 Instead, it consolidated existing federal 
programs and established the Bureau of Education of the Handicapped 
within the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.80 Part 
B of the EHA was designed to help states begin special educatio
programs, or expand and improve upon existing ones.
n 
                                                
81 But without 
specific mandates, it did not significantly improve the existing 
conditions for students with disabilities.82  
In 1973, Congress passed the nondiscrimination Rehabilitation 
Act. § 504 prohibits discrimination against “otherwise qualified” 
people with disabilities for employment in federally funded activities 
and programs.83 The Rehabilitation Act was enacted to help provide 
employment opportunities to people with mental and physical 
disabilities.84 In doing so, it became the “major federal mechanism . . . 
for statutory relief from employment discrimination.”85 But it did not 
contain any monitoring function, nor did it include any funding 
itself.86 Thus, for twenty years § 504 “was virtually ignored by local 
and state educational agencies.”87 Additionally, § 504 applied only to 




78 Colker, supra note 44, at 803. 
79 National Council on Disability, supra note 76. 
80 Colker, supra note 44, at 803. 
81 Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 548 U.S. 
176, 180 (1982). 
82 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 76. 
83 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006).  
84 Comment, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Analyzing Employment 
Discrimination Claims, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 867, 868 (1984). 
85 Id. at 869. 
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until 1990, with the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), that discriminatory practices or policies against people with 
disabilities would be outlawed in employment, public 
accommodations, transportation, and telecommunications, regardless 
of any federal funding.89 The ADA’s scope includes public schools, 
and together with § 504, they provide a frequent basis for alternative 
remedies to the IDEA.90 
Two years later, however, after Mills and PARC expressly 
recognized the right of students with disabilities to a free and 
appropriate public education under the Equal Protection Clause, 
Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
(EAHCA)91. The Supreme Court described the EAHCA in Smith v. 
Robinson as a “comprehensive scheme . . . to aid the States in 
complying with their constitutional obligations to provide public 
education for handicapped children.”92 It established the requirement 
that states receiving federal funds for special education, as well as 
their school boards, provide a free and appropriate public education93 
to a student with a disability in the least restrictive environment.94 
First, however, states had to identify which students were in need of 
special education service.95 To do so, school boards had to perform 
evaluations to assess the impact that a student’s disability had on his 
education.96 Once a child was identified as disabled and in need of 
service, the school board had to develop and maintain an 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 The EAHCA has assumed different titles. It is also commonly referred to as 
Public Law 94–142. In addition, it is sometimes confusingly referred to as the 
Education for the Handicapped Act, or EHA, sharing the same title as the EHA that 
the ESEA was amended to include. The Supreme Court in Smith v. Robinson, 468 
U.S. 992 (1984), referred to the EAHCA as the EHA. Id. at 994. But the two acts are 
not the same. For clarity purposes, this Note keeps the titles distinct. 
92 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984) 
93 Trent D. Nelson, Comment and Note, Congressional Attention Needed for 
the “Stay-Put” Provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 1997 
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 49, 49 (1997). 
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individualized education program (IEP).97 The IEP had to be carried 
out in the least restrictive environment.98 The EAHCA was 
reauthorized in 1990 as the IDEA.99 The 1990 amendments made little 
substantive changes.100 For instance, it substituted all references to 
“handicap” with the term “disability.”101 It also replaced “disabled 
children” with “children with disabilities.”102 Mandates regarding 
FAPE and LRE were largely unaffected.103 
 All fifty states now receive federal financial assistance under 
the IDEA.104 Since the IDEA became effective in 1976, the percentage 
of special-education students ages six through twenty-one has 
increased substantially. Between 1976 and 1994, this group increased 
from 23.8 percent to 51.1 percent of all students with disabilities.105 
During the 1993-94 school year, 4,786,065 students ages six through 
twenty-one received services under the IDEA.106 That translates to 8.1 
percent of the general population.107 As of 2004, the same age group 
increased in number to 6,033,425.108 The increase between 1993 and 
                                                 
97 See discussion infra Part II. 
98 Martin et al., supra note 40, at 30. 
99 Matthew J. Schaefer, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: “Related 
Services” Versus “Medical Services?”[Cedar Rapids Community School District v. 
Garret F., 119 S. Ct. 992 (1999)], 39 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 147 (1999). 
100 Id. 
101 Dixie Snow Huefner, Revisiting Congress’ New IDEA in Special Education, 
1993 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 170, 172 n.11 (1993) 
102 Id. 
103 Schaefer, supra note 100, at 147. 
104 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 1 27TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, 2005 28 
(2005), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2005/parts-b-
c/27th-vol-1.pdf. 
105 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (1995), 
available at http://www2.ed.gov/pubs/OSEP95AnlRpt/ch1b.html. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 1 28TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
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2004 represented a full one percent of the general population, to 9.2 
percent.109  
 Since the 1960s, people with disabilities have come a long 
way. For the entire nineteenth century, and well into the twentieth, 
people with disabilities were neglected and ignored. Those that were 
given access to public schools did not receive the personalized 
attention necessary for a meaningful education.110 The IDEA was 
passed in recognition of this nationwide failure.111 Today, students 
with disabilities, along with their parents,112 have enforceable rights 
that ensure at least an opportunity for a meaningful education, based 
on the unique needs of each of those students. 
 
II. THE IDEA’S STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS 
 
A student’s “individualized education plan” (IEP)113 
determines the appropriateness of her education and the restrictiveness 
of her education environment.114 Practically, this plan serves as the 
basis for the child’s education and placement.115 The different 
provisions are meant to ensure that the unique needs of each child are 
identified and appropriately addressed.116  
Therefore, the IEP is a critical component of the education of 
the child with a disability.117 When creating a program, the first step is 
                                                                                                                   
1.pdf. This report is the most recent available report published by the Department of 
Education. 
109 Id. 
110 See Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 548 
U.S. 176, 179 (1982). 
111 Id. 
112 See Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 535 (2007). 
113 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4) (2006). 
114 20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
115 See Heather J. Russell, Note, Florence County School District Four v. 
Carter: A Good “IDEA”; Suggestions for Implementing the Carter Decision and 
Improving the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1479, 
1485–86 (1996). 
116 See id. 
117 Terry Jean Seligmann, An IDEA Schools Can Use: Lessons from Special 
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evaluating the child’s needs.118 This evaluation cannot rely on any one 
criterion. It must be based on “a variety of assessment tools and 
strategies” used to compile “relevant functional, developmental, and 
academic information.”119 In fact, § 1414 of the IDEA provides strict 
requirements when evaluating a student, from ensuring that the 
evaluation is not racially or culturally discriminatory to employing 
trained professionals who can competently administer the 
evaluation.120 Multiple persons, known as the “[i]ndividualized 
education program team” (IEP team) conduct the evaluation.121 A 
student’s IEP team consists of the student’s parents, at least one 
regular education teacher, at least one special education teacher, a 
representative of the school board,122 someone who can interpret the 
implications of the results on instruction in the classroom, any other 
individuals the parents or school board may deem necessary to attend, 
and, when possible, the student.123 There must be parental consent to 
the evaluation.124 For an initial evaluation, if the parent does not 
consent or respond to a request for an evaluation, the school board can 
institute an evaluation under § 1415.125 However, services cannot be 
provided without consent from the parent or the student.126 After the 
evaluation is complete, the IEP team determines whether the child is 
disabled within the meaning of § 1401(3).127   
                                                 
118 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(i)(II) (2006). 
119 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
120 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(b)(3)(A)(i), (iv) (2006). 
121 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2006). 
122 This representative must meet three criteria: (1) he must be “qualified to 
provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the 
unique needs of children with disabilities”; (2) he must be “knowledgeable about the 
general education curriculum”; and (3) he must be “knowledgeable about the 
availability of resources of the local educational agency.” 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1414(d)(1)(B)(iv)(I)–(III) (2006). 
123 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(B)(i)–(vii) (2006). 
124 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I) (2006). 
125 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(I) (2006). 
126 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(II) (2006). 
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Upon the determination that the child is disabled and in need of 
special services, an IEP is prepared.128 Pursuant to § 1414(a)(C)(i)(I), 
that determination is made in reference to § 1401, which defines a 
“child with a disability” as a child 
 
with mental retardation, hearing impairments (including 
deafness), speech or language impairments, visual 
impairments (including blindness), serious emotional 
disturbance (referred to in this chapter as “emotional 
disturbance”), orthopedic impairments, autism, 
traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or 
specific learning disabilities; and . . . who, by reason 
thereof, needs special education and related services.129  
 
For children ages three through nine, this definition can include 
children who “experienc[e] developmental delays” in at least one of 
the following areas: “physical development; cognitive development; 
communication development; social or emotional development; or 
adaptive development.”130  
Once a child is determined to be disabled, his individualized 
education program is created.131 It includes statements of the child’s 
current educational level of performance, annual goals for the child, 
the educational services the child needs, and how much the student 
will participate in regular educational programs.132 These statements 
all strive to offer the student an appropriate education in the least 
restrictive environment, and they are tailored to that student’s unique 
habits and needs.133 For instance, the statements concerning the extent 
to which the student will participate in regular education programs 
would be directly pursuant to the least restrictive environment. By no 
                                                 
128 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).   
129 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006). 
130 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B)(i) (2006). 
131 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2006). 
132 34 C.F.R. § 300.324 (2009); see also Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough 
of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1213 n.16 (3d Cir. 1993).  
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means does it create a presumption for mainstreaming. Its very title, 
“Individualized Education Program,”134 is itself a good enough 
indication that there are no places for presumptions when interpreting 
the IDEA. Presumptions fail to account for the unique challenges of 
each disability. If the evaluation and the IEP team determine that the 
student’s educational needs are better served entirely away from the 
regular classroom, that is entirely consistent with the IDEA.  
 The IDEA creates a “preference” for placing students with 
disabilities among their peers who do not have disabilities.135 Pursuant 
to that preference, school boards must provide a continuum of 
placement alternatives to the general educational environment.136 
These alternatives recognize the individual nature of education, as they 
account for the varying needs of students with disabilities. The IDEA 
requires this continuum by providing that “[t]o the maximum extent 
appropriate, . . . [the student with a disability is] educated with 
children who are not disabled.”137 This language recognizes that there 
are “infinite variations”138 of appropriateness. For one student, 
attending a general education classroom with the aid of supplementary 
                                                 
134 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2006) (emphasis added). 
135 Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, 181 n.4 (1982). 
136 34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2009); but see N.W. ex rel. A.W. v. Nw. R-1 Sch. 
Dist., 813 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1987) (affirming district court holding that a school 
board was not required to create a new room designed for the specific needs of the 
student with a disability, even though the school board did not have a developed 
special education program, because a lack of funds prohibited placing a specially 
trained teacher in the student’s school without reducing the educational benefits 
provided to other handicapped students); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994) (including cost of placement as a 
factor in determining whether a school board properly placed a student with a 
disability). Engaging in a cost analysis when determining whether a school board has 
failed to comply with the IDEA is not expressly provided for in the IDEA itself. 
Whether this approach is prudent in such an analysis is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
137 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(5)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). 
138 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(a)(1)(i) (2009) provides placement examples of what 
may suffice for meeting the “unique needs of a child with a disability” when 





Monroe: Reasonable Measures": Giving "Due Deference" to School Boards' De
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 5, Issue 2                         Spring 2010 
 
aid may be what is appropriate to the maximum extent. For another, 
the general educational environment may exceed the appropriateness 
for educational benefit, and the student may need to spend the full day 
in a segregated classroom. For still another, “reverse 
mainstreaming,”139 where students who do not have disabilities spend 
parts of their days in a segregated setting with students who have 
disabilities, may be what is most appropriate. The suitability of the 
placement is meant to be determined by an array of considerations, 
which are outlined by regulations promulgated by the Department of 
Education.140  These regulations seek to achieve the most suitable 
environment in which the individual student can be given an 
appropriate education reserved for by the IDEA.141 
Pursuant to achieving a suitable environment, and given a 
preference for mainstreaming, a student can be removed from the 
regular educational environment only when the disability “is such that 
education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and 
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”142 Therefore, even when 
taking a student with disabilities out of the general educational 
environment, the school board is required to consider which placement 
on the continuum of alternatives is most suitable to ensure that she is 
being educated with her nondisabled peers “to the maximum extent 
appropriate.”143 Additionally, the school board must give preference to 
                                                 
139 See Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 2002). 
140 See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.114–120 (2009). 
141 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(a) (2009) provides that the decision is made by the 
parents, people “knowledgeable about the child, the meaning of the evaluation data, 
and the placement options.” The placement decision must be based on the child’s 
IEP and as close as possible to the student’s home, unless the IEP requires an 
arrangement that the school that she would normally attend cannot provide. 34 
C.F.R. §§ 300.116(b)–(c). Attention must be paid to any “potential harmful effect on 
the child or on the quality of services” that may be needed. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(d). 
The need to modify curriculum to accommodate a student who is disabled is not a 
valid justification for the student’s removal from the general educational 
environment. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(e). 
142 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2)(ii) (2009). 
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the school that the student with disabilities would attend if he did not 
have such disabilities.144  
Through such strict rules and regulations, the IDEA ensures 
that parents are active in the education of the student. The IDEA’s 
“extensive procedural requirements” ensure this participation. 145 First, 
when making the initial evaluation of students to determine whether 
they need IDEA service, the parents must consent.146 Second, after an 
evaluation has been made, parents can still seek a reevaluation if they 
disagree with the evaluation conducted by the school board.147 Third, 
after the IEP is created, the parents must be notified of any proposed 
change or of any refusal by the school board to initiate a change.148 
Fourth, before the student is placed in a special education program, 
parents must again give consent.149 Fifth, in the drafting of the IEP, 
the school board must give the parents “[a]n opportunity . . . to 
examine all records . . . and to participate in meetings with respe







                                                
150 If there is disagreement about the child’s placement, there 
are multiple avenues for dispute resolution that the IDEA requires t
states to create.151 This system of dispute resolution has many 
different levels, from mediation152 up to filing with a federal district
court.153 These different procedures require that the state ensure t
parents are involved. If the parents refuse to get involved, or if the 
children are wards of the state, then surrogates will be appointed.154
 
144 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(b)(3) (2009). This preference for placement at the 
student’s neighborhood school is based on the requirement that a placement be made 
as close to the student’s home as possible. 
145 Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, 182 (1982). 
146 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(iii) (2006). 
147 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). 
148 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (2006); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 182. 
149 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I) (2006). 
150 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2006). 
151 See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415 (e)–(k). 
152 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2006). 
153 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) (2006). 
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With such overarching procedural requirements, the IDEA ensures 
that children in need of services have a person who is partial to their 
education.155 
 To ensure that these procedural requirements are given effect, 
the IDEA requires recipient states to create the infrastructure that thei
school districts will use to provide the necessary services to children
with disabilities. § 1412(a) requires them to submit plans that show 
how they will provide eligible students with the services necessary f









l standards through the extensive 
ute 
l 
 a due 
      
156 School boards must submit t
their state “educational agency” plans on how they will meet the 
IDEA’s requirements.157 § 1413 comprises the spending specification
that were lacking in the ESEA of 1965 and the EHA of 1970. S
boards must use federal funds only to pay for “excess costs of 
providing special education and related services to children with 
disabilities;” to “supplement State, local and other Federal funds and 
not to supplant such funds;” and to reduce the amount of local funds 
put towards providing special education services.158 Thus, the IDEA 
gives the states the “primary responsibility” for creating education
policies for children with disabilities,159 while ensuring that tho
programs meet certain federa
procedural requirements.160  
 A critical part of those procedural requirements is the disp
resolution process. §§ 1415(e)–(i) outline the infrastructure that 
recipient states must construct for disputes that arise between schoo
boards and parents of students with disabilities.161 First, the parties 
may seek to resolve their dispute through mediation.162 Even if that 
process is chosen, it does not preclude the parties from initiating
                                           
155 Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, 
)(i)–(iii) (2006). 
.S. at 183. 
6). 
182 n.6 (1982). 
156 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2006). 
157 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (2006). 
158 20 U.S.C. §§ 1413(a)(2)(A
159 Rowley, 458 U
160 Id. at 182. 
161 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e)–(i) (200
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process hearing.163 If the parties decide to initiate a due proc
hearing in front of a disinterested “hearing officer,” who is 
independent from the state’s education agency or the involved school 

















                                                
164 Any party
is entitled to appeal before the state’s education agency.165 Decisio
made in the hearing and on appeal are binding,166 but an
e file a civil action in federal district court.167  
 The procedural requirements are robust, yet they 
discretion with the states to form educational policies. This 
“‘cooperative federalism’”168 includes nothing about equal services 
from state to state. After all, the focus of the IDEA is the individua
student. This focus is supported by the language of the IDEA. For 
instance, if Congress intended for each state to have the same amoun
of funding, and thus the same amount of services, it would not have 
used language such as “appropriate”169 or “individuals.”170 Th
of generality that the IDEA uses also supports the notion that 
Congress’ focus was on individuals, not states. Therefore, the level o
service for each state must be determined by the number of students 
within a state’s borders who are in need of special education services
and by the amount of services that children need to ensure that they 
are receiving an appropriate education. Congress cannot create blanket 
national standards if it wants to ensure that each child with a disabilit
ving the type of education that is appropriate for him or her.  
Ultimately, the structure and operations of the IDEA mus
interpreted in light of the preference for including children with 
disabilities among children who do not have disabilities. Many of 
provisions operate in ways that ensure that school districts prefer 
placing the child with disabilities in regular education environments. A
 
163 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). 
164 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A) (2006). 
165 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2006). 
166 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(A) (2006). 
167 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2006). 
168 See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005). 
169 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2006).  
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test that examines the reasonableness of a board’s decision in placing 
the student with disabilities in one environment or another adhere
this preference, keeps courts in the courthous
s to 
es, and ensures that the 
IDEA’s procedural safeguards oper eep parents or partial 
parties i
III. THE C  SHOULD  






sometimes struck others.  Before 
      
ate to k
nvolved in that student’s education. 
 
URRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT AND HOW IT
AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Reasonableness Test 
 
 In Board of Education v. Ross, the Seventh Circuit was asked 
to reverse the district court’s affirmance of an independent hearing 
officer’s finding that the school board did not violate the IDEA wh
it placed Michael and Diane Ross’ daughter, Lindsay, in a restrict
special education setting.171 Lindsay had Rett syndrome, which is 
caused by mutations on a gene found on the X chromosome that 
affects almost exclusively females.172 Lindsay was nonverbal, lacke
consistent ability to control her body and limbs, and had cognitive 
functioning equivalent to that of an eight-to-ten-month-old gi 173
Often, Lindsay’s hands would lock together, which would require a 
teacher to unlock them.174 In addition, Lindsay created loud 
vocalizations lasting from a few seconds to over a minute.175 She also 
inflicted injuries upon herself and 176
high school, she attended a regular public school in her neighborhood, 
where she was mainstreamed.177  
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e, and overall regression while in the general 
ed 
t 




                                                
178 After much compromise, the parents 
agreed to place Lindsay in her local high school under a shortened
schedule.179 After a year of modest improvement, Lindsay began to 
exhibit stress, fatigu
education environment.180 The board decided to put Lindsay in a 
multiple needs program.181 The parents objected and initiated a due 
process hearing.182 
 The independent hearing officer and district court both agre
that the school board complied with the IDEA’s LRE requirement.183 
On appeal, the Rosses maintained that the school board failed to 
consider all supplementary aids and services that could be used a
Lindsay’s neighborhood sc 184
special education teacher to work with her in between academic year
as well as another special education teacher and a teacher’s aide 
during the school year.185 
 The Seventh Circuit declined to overturn the findings at the 
state or lower court levels, and in doing so, it devised its test for 
evaluating LRE compliance. The Court first noted that “it is not 
enough to show that a student is obtaining some benefit, no matt
how minimal, at the mainstream school” in order to demonstrate that a 
board’s removal of a student with a disability violated the LRE 
requirement.186 To successfully challenge a board’s decision to 
remove a student with a disability from a mainstreamed setting, pa
challenging a placement must show—after the reviewing court gives 
“due deference to the administrative findings”—that the student’s 
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would have made it so.”187 In other words, if the court determines tha
the general education classroom was satisfactory, the school district 
t 





rs concluded that, because Lindsay was 
ot receiving an appropriate education in the general education 
environment, even with those services, its decision to remove Lindsay 
id not violate the IDEA.  
e Court of 
e 
IDEA. Rafael Oberti was an eight-year-old boy afflicted with Down 
                                                
erred in removing the student with a disability.188 If the environment 
was not satisfactory but there were reasonable measures available to 
make it satisfactory, the school board erred in removing 189
 Applying that inquiry, the Ross court concluded that the bo
did not err. First, the Rosses could not demonstrate that Lindsay was 
making “meaningful progress” in the general education 
environment.190 The IEP goals that she met were achieved in the 
segregated setting, not in the general education environment.191
During the spring of one year, she attended her English class for th
full period only twice.192 She interacted with her peers minimally and 
disrupted the class with her loud vocalizations and physical 
interference.193 The court deferred to the opinions of experts who
testified at the administrative and lower court levels. It found that the 
administrative findings and judgment, as well as the district court’s 
conclusion to uphold them, were reasonable and free from clear 
error.194 The services that the school board provided were reasonable, 




B.  The Third Circuit’s Multi-Factor Test 
 
 Oberti v. Board of Education was the first case in th
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syndrome.196 His first IEP provided that he would attend a 
“developmental” kindergarten at his neighborhood school in the 
morning.197 In the afternoon, he would attend a special education class 
in another school district.198 In the developmental class, Rafael was 
disruptive.199 He routinely crawled and hid under furniture, and he
was violent—on several occasions, hitting and spitting on other 
children, the teacher, and the teacher’s aide.
 
 
uld attend a segregated class. 
hile i
 
presented two expert witnesses, a psychologist from Temple 
University and a special education specialist from Rafael’s 
                                                
200 However, during his 
special education class, he was not disruptive.201 Accordingly, his IEP
Team proposed placing Rafael in a segregated special education class 
for the entire year.202 The parents objected to this decision,203 but the 
school board refused to modify its proposal. Through mediation, the 
dispute was resolved so that Rafael wo
W n the more restrictive environment, Rafael’s behavior 
improved and he began to make academic progress.204  
 The Obertis objected to this placement when they learned that 
Rafael had no meaningful contact with his peers who were not 
disabled.205 They initiated a due process hearing.206 The 
administrative law judge (ALJ) heard testimony from both sides.207 
The school board presented eight witnesses, all of whom had close 
contact with Rafael.208 They all testified to one degree or another that 
a segregated setting was more appropriate for Rafael.209 The Obertis
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vironment.    
e 
ities.  
211 The ALJ discounted their opinions because they 
did not have the same degree of familiarity with Rafael as the
board’s witnesses.212 Concluding that Rafael was not ready for 
mainstreaming, the ALJ affirmed the school board’s decision t
him in the least restrictive en 213
 The Third Circuit disagreed with the ALJ’s decision. At the 
beginning of its discussion on the LRE requirement, it cited the 
Fourteenth Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the 
IDEA from 1992, wherein the U.S. Department of Education reported 
that two-thirds of the states that received funding were not in 
compliance.214 In light of that report, it declared its “obligation to 
enforce the statutory provisions [of the IDEA].”215 Certainly, 
Congress gave the federal judiciary an important role in helping to 
ensure that the states complied with the IDEA.216 However, in light of 
the court’s use of this report, its interpretation of the LRE requirement 
as creating a presumption for mainstreaming, and the little deference it 
gave to the school board and the ALJ, the Oberti court seemed to giv
itself an affirmative role in ensuring that school boards mainstream 
students with disabil 217
 The Fifth Circuit’s test in Daniel R.R. v. State Board of 
Education218 was adopted by the Oberti court.219 The Fifth Circuit’s 
test consists of two parts. First, the reviewing court must ask “whether 
                                                 
210 Id. at 1209–10. The Obertis also presented their own testimony and that of a 
neighbor to support their argument that, with additional services and aids, Rafael 
was capable of progressing in a general education classroom. For purposes of the 
ALJ’s decision and the Third Circuit’s rejection of that decision, only the two expert 
witnesses are necessary. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 1210. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 1214 n.20. 
215 Id. at 1214.  
216 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2006); Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson 
Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183 (1982). 
217 Oberti, 995 F.3d at 1216–17. 
218 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989) 
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education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids 
and services, can be achieved satisfactorily.”220 Second, if education 
cannot be achieved satisfactorily within the regular classroom, then t
reviewing court must decide “whether the school has mainstreamed 




vices that aid 
t 
 





understood that a fundamental value of the right to public education 
                                                
221 For the first quest
the Oberti court identified three factors. First, the reviewing court 
should examine the steps that the school took to try to include the 
child in a regular classroom.222 It based this factor on Departm
Education regulations, which require schools to (1) provide a 
“continuum of placements”223 that offer alternatives to the regular 
education environment and (2) provide for additional ser
a student with a disability placed in a general education 
environment.224 Courts consider this factor to weigh “particularly 
heavily against the School Board” because if a party shows that the 
school board failed to provide such services, the school board has mos
likely failed to provide an FAPE.225 Given this factor’s importance, it
can be considered to provide g
by courts employing this test. 
 Second, the reviewing court should compare the benefits that 
disabled child would receive from placement in a general education 
classroom with the benefits that she would receive from placement in
a segregated setting.226 The Oberti court remarked that this factor’s 
analysis requires heavy reliance on testimony of educational experts
and paying special attention to the “unique benefits” obtained from 
integration in a regular classroom.227 Interestingly, and unfound
the language of the IDEA, the court concluded that “Congress 
 
220 Daniel, 874 F.2d at 1048. 
221 Id. 
222 Oberti, 995 F.3d at 1216. 
223 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2009). 
224 Id. 
225 Warton v. New Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 217 F. Supp. 2d 261, 275 (D. Conn. 
2002). 
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for children with disabilities is the right to associate with nondisabled 
peers.”228  
 Third, the court should examine to what extent a disabled 
child’s placement in a regular classroom will “negatively” affect other 
children.229 The Oberti court was careful to emphasize that for this 
factor to provide grounds for the removal of a child with a disability 
from a general classroom, the disruption must be so significant as to 
“impair” other students from being educated satisfactorily.230 This 
question requires considering how much attention the teacher gave to 
the student with a disability and whether that attention reached a 
degree that caused her to ignore the other students.231 In its 
explanation of this factor, the court noted that it should be considered 
in light of the first factor described above, i.e., that the services that 
the school board has to provide might present some disruption.232 
Therefore, the court seemed to imply that there will inevitably be some 
negative effects; the question is how much. 
 When the court applied these factors, it concluded that the 
school board had not complied with this mainstreaming 
requirement.233 For the first factor, it characterized the school board’s 
efforts as “negligible,” concluding that the board did not do enough to 
satisfy the factor because it did not provide a curriculum plan, a 
behavior management plan, or enough support to the teacher.234 
Considering the importance that this factor has in the compliance 
analysis, the court’s conclusion could have rested on this failure alone. 
It remarked that the board’s failure to provide these services violated 
the IDEA.235  
 The court concluded that the board did not meet the second 
factor because the benefits of integration outweighed the benefits of 
                                                 
228 Id. at 1216–17. 
229 Id. at 1217. 
230 Id.  
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 1220–24. 
234 Id. at 1220. 
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segregation.236 It agreed with the district court’s finding, which relied 
heavily on testimony, some of which was not given at the 
administrative hearing.237 The board’s witnesses, as described above, 
testified that the most appropriate placement for Rafael was a 
segregated setting.238 Conflictingly, the Obertis’ witnesses testified 
that, with more services and the modification of the curriculum for 
Rafael, he could be included in a general education classroom.239 
While the ALJ determined that the board had presented enough 
evidence to demonstrate appropriateness, the Oberti court concluded 
that the district court gave “due weight” when it heard different 
testimony, which resulted in the overturning of the ALJ’s 
determinations.240 
 The court also concluded that the board failed to satisfy the 
third factor. It concluded that the behavior that Rafael exhibited while 
placed in the general classroom—throwing furniture, hitting other 
children and the teacher, hiding, etc.—was an inadequate justification 
for removal because the board did not satisfy the first factor.241 The 
district court found that if the board provided Rafael with additional 
support services, he would cause less disruption, which the Oberti 
court found not to be clearly erroneous.242  
 The Ross test differs from the Oberti test in significant ways. 
Ross affords administrative findings and school board decisions 
greater deference than the Oberti test does. Under Ross, the district 
court and the appellate court are to give “due deference.” This 
language is in contrast to the Oberti test that, by its nature, allows a 
higher level of scrutiny by reviewing courts. Oberti requires the 
reviewing court to engage in a multi-factor test that inevitably puts the 
court in the classroom. This type of analysis is of the same character 
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and on the same level as school boards’ placement determinations.243 
The “due deference” weight under Ross, in contrast, does not yield 
entirely to the findings of administrative hearings and school districts, 
but it does not intrude deeply upon the province of school officials 
because it is tempered by the “reasonable measures” standard.244 
According to this language, a court will defer to the lower level 
findings insofar as it is not unreasonable to do so. As a result, a court 
will avoid engaging in analysis that the IDEA leaves for school 
boards.245 
 
C. Supreme Court Precedent and Pertinent IDEA Language 
 
1. Rowley’s Impact 
 
 In Board of Education v. Rowley,246 the Supreme Court held 
that an FAPE requires states receiving federal funding to “provid[e] 
personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the 
child to benefit educationally from that instruction.”247 In Rowley, the 
parents of a deaf student, Amy, sued the school board for violating the 
IDEA when it failed to provide their daughter with an education that 
did not maximize her potential.248 During elementary school, Amy 
progressed from grade to grade without problem and was an above-
average student.249 During this time, she did not have an interpreter 
with her in the classroom.250 The school board determined that Amy 
did not need an interpreter to comply with the IDEA.251 The parents 
disagreed, arguing that her achievement could be much higher if she 
                                                 
243 See id. at 1217–18. 
244 Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 277 
(7th Cir. 2007).. 
245 See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (2006); Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick 
Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207–09 (1982). 
246 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
247 Id. at 203. 
248 Id. at 185–86. 
249 Id. at 185. 
250 Id. 
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had an interpreter and that, without one, the school board violated the 
FAPE requirement.252  
 The Supreme Court disagreed.253 In doing so, it devised a two-
part test for determining whether a school board complied with the 
IDEA’s FAPE requirements. First, “has the State complied with the 
procedures set forth in the Act?”254 And second, is the IEP, 
“developed through the Act’s procedures[,] reasonably calculated to 
enable the child to receive educational benefits?”255 It concluded that a 
state was not obligated to maximize the potential of students receiving 
IDEA services; it is only obligated to provide “personalized 
instruction” with enough support services to allow the child to benefit 
from that instruction.256 The intent of the IDEA “was more to open the 
door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms 
than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside.”257  
 Applying this standard to the facts in Rowley, the Court found 
that the school board had complied with the FAPE requirement.258 As 
the district court found, Amy had been progressing from grade to 
grade with above average performance.259 The school board provided 
her with instruction and services that were tailored to her individual 
needs.260 Because of her demonstrated progress, the Court concluded 
that the school board did not have to provide her with a sign-language 
interpreter to comply with the IDEA.261   
 In its decision, the Court emphasized the importance of 
deference to school boards and to the administrative hearing 
process.262 While the Court was unwilling to go so far as to agree with 
the school board that Congress meant to give reviewing courts only 
                                                 
252 Id. at 185. 
253 Id. at 200. 
254 Id. at 206. 
255 Id. at 207. 
256 Id. at 200 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 14 (1975)). 
257 Id. at 192. 
258 Id. at 210. 
259 Id. at 209–10. 
260 Id. at 210. 
261 Id. 
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“limited authority to review for state compliance,” and no authority to 
review a program’s substance, it was also unwilling to side with 
Rowley, who advocated for de novo review.263 Instead, it concluded 
that the language of § 1415(i)(2)(C)(i), which provides administrative 
procedures for the reviewing court to follow, requires it to give “due 
weight” to the findings at the administrative hearing level.264  
 It based its emphasis on the statutory structure and legislative 
history of the IDEA.265 It was unwilling to side with the school board 
because Congress provided that the reviewing court must “bas[e] its 
decision on the preponderance of the evidence.”266 In addition, the 
legislative history indicated that Congress wanted the reviewing courts 
to make “‘independent decisions.’”267 This preponderance standard, in 
light of that history, indicated that Congress meant for the reviewing 
courts to have a fair amount of reviewing power, but an amount that 
fell short of de novo.268 Given the highly detailed provisions of 
§ 1415269 that outline the administrative hearing process, in relation to 
the vague “substantive admonitions” of the IDEA, the Court 
determined that Congress meant for the procedural guidelines to 
                                                 
263 Id. at 206. 
264 Id. In 1982, this language was under § 1415(e). Its equivalent today is 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(i)–(iii) (2006), which provides: 
 
(C) Additional requirements. In any action brought under this 
paragraph, the court-- 
         (i) shall receive the records of the administrative 
proceedings; 
         (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; 
and 
         (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, 
shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate. 
 
265 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204–09. 
266 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006). 
267 Rowley, 458 U.S. at at 205 (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-455, at 50 (1975)). 
268 Id. 
269 20 U.S.C. § 1415 provides the “[p]rocedural safeguards” of the dispute 
resolution process within the IDEA. It covers ten pages of the United States Code, 
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ensure substantive compliance with the IDEA.270 These highly 
detailed procedural requirements ensured that the parents and the 
school boards were equally involved in the formulation of educational 
goals for the student with a disability.271 In addition, the IDEA 
requires that the district court “receive the records of the 
administrative proceedings.”272 This importance that “Congress has 
attached to compliance with certain procedures” would be undermined 
if a reviewing court used de novo review.273 
 The Court also pointed to federalist principles for support in its 
decision to require courts to defer to the administrative hearing 
process.274 The IDEA left with the states, local educational agencies, 
and the students’ parents the principal responsibility of providing 
children with disabilities with an appropriate education.275 Local 
education agencies are responsible for providing to their Secretary of 
State plans that demonstrate their compliance with the IDEA.276 
Moreover, states traditionally formulate and execute educational 
policy.277 Given this traditional role, coupled with clear statutory 
language, the Court refused to conclude that Congress intended to 
grant federal courts a degree of power that would allow them to 
overturn local boards’ decisions, affirmed by state administrative 
hearing processes, as easily as de novo would allow.278 
 Even though Rowley concerns the FAPE requirement of the 
IDEA, it should provide some guidance as to what constitutes an LRE. 
In fact, one court said that Rowley does have an impact on LRE, 
“demarcat[ing] an outer limit to the IDEA’s LRE preference.”279 
While many courts have determined that Rowley’s two-part test is “not 
                                                 
270 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205–06. 
271 Id. at 206. See discussion supra Part II. 
272 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(i) (2006). 
273 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. 
274 Id at 207. 
275 Id. 
276 See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (2006). 
277 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208 n.30. 
278 See id. at 205–08. 
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particularly useful” in determining whether the LRE requirement is 
satisfied, that determination does not mean that the opinion should be 
ignored outright when examining an LRE.280 As this Note will 
examine in greater detail in Part III.A.2, what is appropriate for an 
FAPE and for an LRE should be analyzed together.  
 This relationship is consistent with the IDEA’s language as 
interpreted in Rowley and the Seventh Circuit’s test in Board of 
Education v. Ross.281 In Rowley, the Court observed that Congress did 
not intend for there to be a rigid presumption for mainstreaming; it 
first characterized the Act’s language as creating a “preference for 
‘mainstreaming,’” and then noted that the language even provides for 
some students with disabilities to be educated in an entirely segregated 
setting.282 Oberti’s characterization of LRE as requiring a 
presumption283 ignores this observation and how it should relate to the 
deference that the Rowley Court emphasized.  
 In addition, these characterizations of the IDEA interfere with 
the prerogatives of the states to formulate their educational policies 
that Rowley concluded remained with them. While the Rowley Court 
recognized that the IDEA “imposes significant requirements” on 
states, the greater part of the opinion is devoted to discussing how the 
IDEA left to the states the task of formulating educational polices that 
address the placement of a child with a disability.284 To impose upon 
the states a presumption, or to afford a student with a disability a 
“right” to being mainstreamed, usurps this responsibility of the states 
because it ignores the careful and highly detailed deliberations in 
which the IEP teams engage when formulating IEPs. These tests 
requiring school boards to rebut a presumption of mainstreaming or 
inclusion do not incorporate the deference that the Rowley Court found 
Congress intended courts to give to the states and their school boards. 
 
                                                 
280 See Mavis v. Sobol, 839 F. Supp. 968, 982 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). 
281 See 486 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2007). 
282 Rowley, 435 U.S. at 181 n.4 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006)). 
283 Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 
1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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2. § 1412 
 
 Examining the pertinent language of the IDEA shows that 
Rowley should be considered when determining whether a school 
board has complied with the LRE requirement. The LRE provision of 
the IDEA, § 1412(a)(5)(A), provides that children with disabilities are 
to be educated with children without disabilities “[t]o the maximum 
extent appropriate.”285 As the Supreme Court observed, this language 
establishes at least a preference for including a child with a disability 
in a general education environment.286 Moreover, properly 
understanding the operative effect of the LRE provision requires 
reading it in light of the rest of the statute.287 The section immediately 
following it qualifies this mainstreaming requirement by providing: 
 
A State funding mechanism shall not result in 
placements that violate the requirements of 
[§ 1412(a)(5)(A)], and a State shall not use a funding 
mechanism by which the State distributes funds on the 
basis of the type of setting in which a child is served 
that will result in the failure to provide a child with a 
disability a free appropriate public education according 
                                                 
285 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006). This subsection provides in full that  
 
(A) In general. To the maximum extent appropriate, children 
with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions 
or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not 
disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal 
of children with disabilities from the regular educational 
environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the 
disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with 
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved 
satisfactorily. 
 
286 Rowley, 435 U.S. at 202–03. 
287 See Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 
523 (2007) (“a proper interpretation of the Act requires a consideration of the entire 
statutory scheme”). The Winkelman Court held that parents of students with 
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to the unique needs of the child as described in the 
child’s IEP.288 
 
 This language essentially provides that a state cannot fund money in 
any way that violates the mainstreaming requirement, or base the 
distribution of funds on a setting that is inappropriate for the particular 
child and would consequently fail to provide that child with an FAPE. 
First, this qualifying provision demonstrates that there is not a 
presumption for mainstreaming. If a state could base the disbursement 
of federal funds on placing a student with a disability in a general 
education setting, it would be in violation of this provision unless the 
school board rebuts a presumption for the placement. But as the 
language indicates, the setting must be tailored to the “unique needs” 
of the child.289 By definition, a presumption does not take into account 
unique needs. The language of § 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) does not support 
such a scheme.  
 Second, this provision requires a recipient state to consider the 
placement of a student with a disability when determining whether the 
student is receiving an FAPE. As established above, a state cannot 
distribute funds based on the placement of a student with a disability 
in an environment that would deprive him of an FAPE. Therefore, 
because a school district has to certify to its Secretary of State that it 
has policies to comply with the IDEA,290 that district has to show that 
it is placing students in environments that will not deprive them of 
FAPEs. This requirement necessitates a district to consider the FAPE 
and LRE in light of each other.  
 In this light, therefore, Rowley’s interpretation of an FAPE is 
relevant to an LRE determination. A reasonableness test better 
provides for this dynamic than an Oberti-type factor-based test that 
intrudes upon the province of school officials. First, a school board is 
charged with formulating educational policies for the individual 
students with disabilities. As §§ 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) and 1413 provide, a 
school district has to certify to its state government that it is complying 
                                                 
288 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) (2006) (emphasis added). 
289 Id. 
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with the IDEA,291 and to do so, it must draft policies that place 
students with disabilities in environments that will not compromise 
their FAPEs. To satisfy these provisions, a school board will have to 
carefully consider each student’s placement. This expertise provided 
the main reason for the Rowley Court’s emphasis on giving deference 
to school board determinations.292  
 A reasonableness test is sensitive to these considerations. It 
gives the deference that is necessary to ensure that a school board’s 
determinations are not disturbed unless a reviewing court finds that a 
school board could have used “reasonable measures” to provide a 
child with an FAPE in a general education environment, and it did not 
do so.293 This largely deferential inquiry will leave intact the careful 
deliberations in which schools boards are required to engage when 
formulating IEPs. In addition, it will leave intact the judgments 
rendered by the administrative hearing process that each state is 
required to provide and that the Supreme Court concluded was a 
mechanism in ensuring substantive compliance.294  
 Conversely, an Oberti-type factor-based test that is premised 
on the misunderstanding that students with disabilities have a right to 
be included in the general education environment intrudes into these 
careful deliberations, and this can ultimately be counterproductive and 
violative of the IDEA. For instance, if a student is violent towards his 
peers and is destructive towards school property, and a school board 
determines that such a student is disruptive and therefore should be 
removed from the general education environment, that determination 
is partially based on §§ 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) and 1413 . If a reviewing 
court, applying a test similar to the Oberti test, overturns that decision 
and puts the student with a disability back in the general education 
environment, it puts that student in a placement that the school board 
determined was inappropriate, which is inconsistent with the FAPE 
                                                 
291 See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1413. 
292 Bd. of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 
U.S. 176, 206 (1982). 
293 Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 277 
(7th Cir. 2007). 
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requirement. This forced placement is contrary to the school board’s 
compliance with §§ 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) and 1413.  
 Moreover, school districts that are within the jurisdiction of a 
reviewing court that employs this type of test will be forced to 
formulate IEPs that would pass this test. To do so, the districts will 
place students in general education environments even when they 
might have done otherwise. This result is inconsistent with the 
operations of §§ 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) and 1413. However, a 
reasonableness test along the lines of Ross’s “reasonable measures” 
inquiry comports with these statutory provisions by virtue of its 
deference. It will not question the delicate decisions that school boards 
make when determining whether the placement of a student with a 
disability is appropriate in light of his or her FAPE.  
 Given the language of the IDEA, a Ross-type test is preferable. 
While a Ross-type test has its shortcomings, it is superior to an Oberti-
type test under federalist principles as well. By its nature, Ross’s 
standard sets a lower bar for school districts than a factor-based test. 
Conceivably, a student with a disability could be placed in a more 
restrictive setting than is appropriate because a school board refuses to 
provide more services than it considers to be “reasonable.” However, 
in light of Supreme Court precedent that observed the federalism 
dynamic that the IDEA provides, a Ross type test is more appropriate.  
Federalism precedent holds that when construing a statute, it should 
not be read to infringe on traditional realms of state power.295 
Education is a traditional realm of state power.296 The Rowley Court 
concluded that the IDEA kept education with the states, even though it 
imposed conditions upon how federal funds were to be spent for 
special education.297 The Court did not conclude that the IDEA 
provided for federal intrusion into this realm of power, and without a 
“clear and manifest purpose” in a statute’s language, courts are not to 
interpret federal legislation to so intrude.298 An Oberti-type test 
intrudes too far into this realm, upsetting this traditional federalist 
                                                 
295 Dep’t of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 345 (1994) 
296 U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995). 
297 Rowley, 458 U.S. 183–84. 
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relationship. Moreover, as demonstrated, it could potentially lead to 
results that conflict with the very statute that it is enforcing.  
 
3. Schaffer v. Weast’s Impact 
 
 One ground for the presumption for integration in a general 
education environment was the understanding that a school board 
always had the burden of persuasion in cases involving the IDEA.299 
The Oberti court made the same interpretation.300 But the Supreme 
Court has since rejected that interpretation, calling the integration 
presumption into questionable light that goes beyond the operations of 
§§ 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) and 1413.  
 In Schaffer v. Weast, the Court held that, instead of the burden 
always being placed on the school board, it would be “placed upon the 
party seeking relief.”301 Therefore, when students with disabilities 
seek to challenge their placements, they will have the burden of 




                                                
302 From preschool to seventh grade, 
was placed in a private school, where he struggled academically.303 
School officials informed his parents that the IEP team needed to 
reevaluate his IEP and place him in a setting that would “better 
 
299 Bd. of Educ., Sacramento City United Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 
874, 880 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d, 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). 
300 Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 
1207 (3d Cir. 1993). 
301 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005). Its holding applied only to the “burden of 
persuasion.” Id. at 56. The Court found it necessary to explain the term “burden of 
proof” as “one of the slipperiest member[s] of the family of legal terms.” Id. 
(internal quotations omitted). “Burden of proof” contained two different burdens: 
“burden of persuasion,” “i.e., which party loses if the evidence is closely balanced,” 
and the “‘burden of production,’ i.e., which party bears the obligation to come 
forward with the evidence at different points in the proceeding.” Id. (quoting Dir., 
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dept. of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 
U.S. 267, 272 (1994)). The Court was careful to say that Schaffer concerns “only the 
burden of persuasion.” Id. 
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accommodate his needs.”304 Brian’s parents contacted the local sch
board, which evaluated Brian and developed an IEP that placed him in






ress, the Court was unwilling to depart from that 
is for 
for 
                                                
305 Brian’s parents disagreed; they 
believed that Brian needed “smaller classes and more intensive 
services.”306 They unilaterally placed Brian in another private scho
initiated a due process hearing challenging the school board’s IE
sought compensation for the cost of Brian’s tuition at the private 
s 307  
 After a rather complex procedural history, in which the case 
went up and down the judicial ladder twice, the Fourth Circuit held 
that there was no persuasive reason for always resting the burden of 
persuasion with the school district.308 The Supreme Court affirmed. It 
rejected the parents’ argument that a school board should always have 
the burden of persuasion, even when it is not seeking relief.309 
Traditionally, the party seeking relief has the burden of persuasion. 
Cases in which the burden of persuasion is placed on the opposing 
party at the beginning of a proceeding are rare, and without express 
direction from Cong
traditional rule.310  
 Consequently, since Schaffer, the Oberti presumption for 
integration, as embodied in its factor test, stands in questionable light. 
Its placement of the burden on the school board provides one bas
its presumption. Indeed, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of California remarked that the presumption 
integration rested on the school board bearing the burden of 
persuasion.311 The court cited a federal regulation that implemented 




306 Id. at 54–55. 
307 Id. at 55. 
308 Id. 
309 Id. at 59. 
310 Id. 
311 Bd. of Educ., Sacramento City United Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 
874, 880 n. 7 (E.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d, 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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even noted that “[a]lthough this regulation is not promulgated under 
the IDEA, it reflects the same strong preference for 
mainstreaming.”313 Of course, this obscure federal authority, 
promulgated to implement an unrelated piece of legislation, is 
, but 
 
n if one 
 
f 
, together with Schaffer, 
uch a factor test rests on shaky foundations. 
 
IV. AN INAPPROPRIATE OUTCOME UNDER OBERTI 
 
fter that 
                                                
unworthy of such reliance in light of Schaffer.  
 The Oberti court did not rely on such tenuous authority
instead relied on what is today § 1412(a)(5), the provision for 
mainstreaming.314 However, as previously established, § 1412(a)(5)
does not provide for a presumption because of § 1412(a)(5)(B)(i)’s 
requirement that FAPE and LRE be examined together.315 Eve
disagrees with this interpretation of §1412(a)(5)(B)(i) and the 
operative result it has with § 1413,316 the burden of persuasion can no 
longer provide a basis for an integration presumption. Thus, standing
alone, the Schaffer holding casts Oberti’s presumption for inclusion 
into doubt. Because the Oberti test was created partially because o
this presumption, it too is cast into doubt by the Schaffer holding. 
When one considers the statutory provisions of §§ 1412(a)(5)(B)(i) 
and 1413, which brings in the Rowley opinion
s
 
 Oberti’s intrusive consequences can be demonstrated by 
examining A.S. ex rel. S. v. Norwalk Board of Education,317 a district
court case from the Second Circuit that applied the Oberti test.318 In 
A.S., A. was in a segregated facility until the fourth grade.319 A
time, she was mainstreamed with an aide and an independent 
 
ist., 995 
F.2d  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (1994)). 
supra Part III.C.2. 
erti test in P. v. Newington Board of 
Educ . 
, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 537. 
313 Id. 
314 See Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Clementon Sch. D
 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing
315 See 
316 Id. 
317 183 F. Supp. 2d 534 (D. Conn. 2002). 
318 The Second Circuit adopted the Ob
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consultant.320 After behavior problems escalated, the school boar








ewing the IHO’s application 
f the Oberti factors, upheld the finding. 
 
A. Oberti’s First Factor 
as 
d 
                                                
321 The parents objected, and both sides agreed to
place A. in a general education setting with the same IEP plan for the 
previous year.322 During that year, A.’s behavior problems continued, 
and the board renewed its proposal to place A. in a segregated setting
while mainstreaming her in certain non-academic courses.323 Whe
each side refused to compromise, they filed separate due process 
hearings.324 The IHO concluded that A.’s placement in a general 
education setting was inappropriate.325 Applying Oberti, it also found, 
however, that the board’s proposal did not satisfy the IDEA’s LRE.326 
Consequently, the IHO ordered both parties to reconvene to generat
new IEP that met A.’s needs appropriately.327 It concluded th
board had to compensate A.’s parents for their use of expert 
consultants during the failed attempts at creating a new IEP.328 The 
board appealed, but the district court, revi
o
 
 Looking at the first factor, “whether the school district h
made reasonable efforts to accommodate the child in a regular 
classroom,”329 the court determined that the board had not considere
enough degrees of services.330 The school board provided a special 










328 Id. at 539. 
329 Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 
1204, 1218 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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physical and occupational therapist, a speech and language therapist, 
and a teacher of the visually impaired.331 The IHO concluded that the 
board failed to consider more services that might have allowed for A. 
to continue in a regular education environment, and the court 
agreed.332 It also found that the board did not consider providing A
with “direct special education services” in the regular classroom, 
“rather than leav[ing] the student to receive educational directions 
from an aide or a regular education teacher who does not have the 









                                                
333 The court agreed and 
found that the school should have considered peer tutoring
additional staff training and extracurricular activities.334  
 In its decision, the court said that Oberti required a school 
board to consider every possibility and provide whatever servic
help a child achieve academic progress in a regular education 
setting.335 It relied on § 1412(a)(5)(A)’s language that schools m
include students with disabilities with students who do not have 
disabilities “to the maximum extent appropriate.”336 “[T]he plain 
language of the IDEA and its related regulations do not limit the scope 
of supplemental aids and service
a regular education setting.”337 
 However, as demonstrated above, the text of the IDEA does 
not provide a basis for this reading when examining §§ 1412(a
1412(a)(5)(B), and 1413 together. As previously established, 
§ 1412(a)(5)(A) does not stand alone and needs to be read in light
the funding and certification requirements.338 These concomitant 
operations require that in an LRE inquiry, the reviewing cou
the student’s FAPE.339 Because an FAPE is included in the 
 




335 Id. at 545. 
336 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2006). 
337 Oberti, 183 F. Supp. at 545. 
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determination of whether the LRE requirement has been complied 
with, Rowley must apply. Rowley held that a disabled child is entitled 
to “personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit 
the child to benefit educationally from that instruction.”340 It refused
to require school boards to provide disabled children with educationa










 than A., it would similarly uphold the decision 
f the school board.  
                                                
341 If it can be said that 
any particular student’s LRE requires a consideration of that student
FAPE, then the A.S. court incorrectly interpreted § 1412(a)(5)(A)’s 
“[t]o the maximum extent appropriate” language. To require a school 
board to consider and provide all possible services that would achieve
a student’s FAPE would require the board to maximize that st
education potential in a general education environment. This 
application is beyond the calling of the IDE
A.S. court is addressing an LRE question.  
 Under Ross, however, the school board’s efforts would have 
most likely passed muster. In Ross, the school board provided Lindsay 
with half the services that the school board in A.S. provided A. L
received special education services from two special education 
teachers, one in the summer and one during the school year, and a 
teacher’s aide to supplement the regular teacher’s services while she 
was mainstreamed.342 In addition, Lindsay received services from the 
school’s special education program for the half of the day that she was 
not in the general education classroom. A. received considerably
services: a special education teacher, educational consultants, a 
behavioral consultant, a physical and occupational therapist, a spe
and language therapist, and a teacher of the visually impaired.343 




340 Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, 203 (1982). 
341 Id. at 198. 
342 Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 272 
(7th Cir. 2007). 
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 To satisfy this factor, the A.S. court remarked that “the 
appropriate yardstick is whether A., with appropriate supplementa
aids and services, can make progress towards her IEP goals in the 
regular education setting.”344 The court concluded that A. could b
mainstreamed, so long as she had additional services beyond the 
consultants and aides that she already had.345 The school board argued
that the lack of academic progress indicated that the more appropriate 
placement for A. was in a more restricted setting.346 The court, alon
with the IHO, disa
more services.347 
 This conclusion raises a fundamental question: in light of this
decision, how much service is “appropriate”? As established above, 
the A.S. court, applying Oberti, required the school board to provide
every possible service.348 However, research has shown that such a 
degree of services can be counterproductive. Feelings of inferiority
and self-consciousness may arise among students with disabilities 
placed in regular education environments, and such feelings contribute
to disruptive behavior and the impairment of academic progress. Two 
social scientists found that older students with disabilities, possessing
more cognitive ability than younger students or those suffering 
more severe disabilities, and thus able to better articulate their 
feelings, preferred less time with their peers because it was “less 
embarrassing than having a specialist come into the classroo
Another scholar notes that these feelings may arise from an 
“unwarranted integration presumption,”350 i.e., placing students wi
 
344 Id. at 546 (emphasis added). 
345 Id. at 545–549. 
346 Id. at 546. 
347 Id. at 545. 
348 See supra p. 45. 
349 Nancy L. Waldron & James McLesky, The Effects of an Inclusive School 
Program on Students with Mild and Severe Learning Disabilities, 64 EXCEPTIONAL 
CHILD. 395, 402 (1988). 
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disabilities in general education classrooms before there has been 
sufficient demonstration that the student will respond by showin
academic progress, which is an important factor in determining 
whether the child is receiving an FAPE
g 
ce 
 as well 
y to 





 Education Services (ACES),357 
which assessed L.’s behavior.358 
                                                
351. In any event, this eviden
at least shows that the deference that the IDEA requires reviewing 
courts to give to the findings of administrative hearings should be 
greater than the third factor of the Oberti test. If empirical data,
as findings at the state level, show that disruption is caused by 
inappropriate integration, a reviewing court, given limited authorit
overrule those findings under R
scrutiny thate discounts them. 
 This particular problem was at issue in L. ex rel. Mr. F. v. 
North Haven Board of Education,352 an LRE case out of Connecticut
L. suffered from Down syndrome, the same disability as Rafael’s 
Oberti. In class, she was as disruptive as Rafael, acting violently 
towards her peers and teachers, and destructive of her peers’ personal 
property and school property.353 One incident involved her thro
chair at her teacher.354 This behavior was triggered only when 
academic demands and expectations that arose from the general 
education environment were placed on her.355 While there were times 
when L. would behave well in class and get along with others, as soon 
as she received instruction, she became disruptive.356 The court he
testimony from Area Cooperative
 
351 CJN v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 323 F.3d 630, 638 (8th Cir. 2003). 
352 624 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Conn. 2009) 
353 Id. at 174. 
354 Id. at 169. 
355 Id. 
356 Id. 
357 ACES is an organization in Connecticut that provides assistance to school 
boards in developing “cost effective programs and services.” AREA COOPERATIVE 
EDUCATION SERVICES, http://www.aces.org/about/index.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 
2010). Its purpose is to help school boards improve their education, including special 
education. Id. 
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 ACES’ assessment attributed her violent behavior to her 
placement in the general education environment.359 The report 
concluded that her disruptive behavior “stemmed from a frustration 
about her inability to successfully communicate her feelings and a 
desire to escape a potentially punishing situation.”360 A psychiatrist 
hired by L.’s parents attributed her violent behavior to her feelings of 
“‘vulnerability associated with her intellectual impairment.’”361 He 
ascribed this vulnerability to L.’s awareness of the “disparity between 
herself and her peers” and the fact that as she becomes more aware of 
this disparity, she is likely to become more disruptive.362 
 The Ross test avoids any result where a panoply of service 
providers are enlisted just to ensure that a student is kept in a regular 
education environment. By asking whether the school board used 
“reasonable measures” to educate a student satisfactorily, the court 
defers to administrative and trial court findings. Once findings are 
made at the state-level administrative hearing, the reviewing court asks 
whether the decision was “rational.”363 A decision is rational when the 
reviewing court determines that the school board used reasonable 
measures.364 In the context of Ross, the court concluded that the 
board’s use of three different types of services constituted reasonable 
measures.365 Therefore, the court largely deferred to the school 
board’s determinations. Deferring to school boards in this context is 
important because schools are in better positions than courts to 
evaluate the effect that these services have on students with disabilities
when they are placed in a general education environment. The Ober
test, by application, puts courts too far into areas that require in




                                                 




363 Bd. of Educ. of Twp. Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 278 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
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 Moreover, the results that the Oberti test creates might propel 
stereotypes. As humans, we tend to distinguish “characteristics;” 
naturally, therefore, it is human nature to perceive differences in 
people, for better or for worse.366 And when differences become 
stigmatizing, any institutionalization of them should be avoided. For 
instance, one scholar has observed that American society has 
developed in ways that stigmatize disabilities, and she points to one 
particular feature of our society that is a seemingly indispensable part 
of everyday life: steps. She argues that someone in a wheelchair is 
“different only in relation to those who are mobile on foot.”367 This 
difference is significant only because institutions “make this difference 
matter” by requiring people in wheelchairs to gain access differently 
from people who are not in wheelchairs.368 This difference can create 
a stigma; by eliminating different treatment for people with 
disabilities, we as a society can help to eliminate any perceived 
differences.369 
 Congress had this effect in mind when it enacted the IDEA. A
Oberti noted, mainstreaming teaches “nondisabled children to work 
and communicate with children with disabilities,” so as to “elimin





                                                
370 Looking at the language of the IDEA, 
however, Congress was aware that for some students, mainstreaming 
would be ineffective—hence the term “appropriate education.”371 If 
Congress meant for all students to be included in classrooms, it is 
doubtful that it would have chosen such language. The Supreme Co
 
366 Robyn M. Dawes, The Nature of Human Nature: An Empirical Case for 
Withholding Judgment—Perhaps Indefinitely, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 81, 81 (1995) (“We 
understand only characteristics of entities or processes. A claim to understanding the 
entities or processes themselves is based on an ability to combine our understanding 
of their characteristics with sufficient accuracy that we can predict their behavior 
with a probability not too distant from certainty.”). 
367 See MINOW, supra note 31, at 12. 
368 Id. 
369 Id. 
370 Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 
1204, 1216 n.24 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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recognized the import of this terminology when it remarked, whe
referring to the LRE requirement, that Congress understood that 











bility to make this determination free from any intrusive factor test.  
                                                
372 Arguably, at least, when the application of a feder
appeals court test results in, as the A.S. court determined, the 
implementation of over six separate types of services (and as much as
ten, as the A.S. court counted373), just to keep the student in
the classroom, his placement there may be inappropriate.  
 This large number of services may actually propel stigmatic 
perceptions towards students with disabilities. One student, dis
enough to require an aide and a special education teacher, but 
cognizant enough to articulate his feelings, preferred that his 
be provided outside of the regular classroom because he felt 
inferior.374 If receiving two types of service engendered this 
perception, a fortiorari ten types of services could reach the same 
result.375 While A. may have lacked the cognitive ability to articulate 
her discomfort with the providers’ presence, students with less severe 
disabilities do have the mental capacity to be aware that other stu
are not receiving services.376 The L. court found this dynamic as 
well.377 The more appropriate the placement in a general educatio
environment, the less stigmatizing the result. Under Ross, school 






372 Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, 181 n.4 (1982). 
373 A.S. ex rel. S. v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ. 183 F. Supp. 2d 534, 544 (D. Conn. 
2002) 
374 Joseph R. Jenkins & Amy Heinen, Students’ Preferences for Service 
Delivery: Pull-out, In-Class, or Integrated Models, 55 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 516, 
519 (1989). 
375 See A.S., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 544. 
376 See L. ex rel. Mr. F. v. North Haven Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 2d 163, 170 
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rst prong requires, this factor was not a major issue 
 of the 
 provide 
imum” supplementary aids or services, Congress’ 
meaning is vague.  
                                                
 
 The A.S. court concluded that the school board also failed 
satisfy the third Oberti factor.378 The third Oberti factor requires 
courts to ask what “possible negative effect the child’s inclusion may 
have on the education of the other children in the classroom.”379 It also 
requires the courts to consider the effect that additional services 
have on the behavior of a student with a disability.380 The cou
rejected the school board’s evidence that A. had a history of 
disruption.381 The court agreed that the evidence showed some 
disruption, but it found that the record did not clearly indicate whethe
behavioral problems caused the disruption or negative effects to the 
regular education environment.382 While the court seemed to say 
the student’s behavior would have improved with more services 
provided, as the fi
of contention.383  
 While the facts of A.S. do not involve a serious examination of 
the third factor, its reliance on the first factor puts the school board in 
a disadvantaged position. Conceivably, under Oberti’s reading
IDEA, a school board can never argue that a student was too 
disruptive for placement in a regular classroom unless it uses all 
possible types of services. Thus, a district might not ever satisfy this 
factor unless it provides a wealth of services. Congress did not
for this result, even though it could have readily done so.  By 
providing simply that a student with disabilities has to receive 
“supplementary aids or services,” and not expressly providing for 
“unlimited” or “max
 
378 A.S., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 549. 
379 Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 
1204, 1217 (3d. Cir. 1993). 
380 Id. 
381 A.S., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 549. 
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 Advocates for a presumption of mainstreaming would contend 
that this silence should be read in favor of including kids in general 
education classrooms, over school boards’ contrary determinations. 
Oberti reached this result.384 However, this reading goes against 
Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has long maintained 
that when interpreting the breadth of a statute, it should not be read to 
“impinge[] upon or pre-empt[] the States’ traditional powers.”385 
Without a “clear and manifest purpose,” the Supreme Court has 
refused to give a federal statute an overly intrusive scope. 386 In effect, 
the Oberti test, as demonstrated by the result in A.S., intrudes into 
traditional realms of state power without relying on express 
congressional direction to do so. 
 While the IDEA provides for federal judicial review, which is 
a mechanism to gauge compliance,387 the Oberti test’s intrusion goes 
beyond that grant of power.388 The Ross test provides for a much more 
limited ability to question state action in its traditional realms of 
power. Reviewing courts applying Ross will reverse local and state 
determinations only when they have clearly violated the IDEA by not 
using “reasonable measures” to educate the student with disabilities 
satisfactorily.389 This test ensures that courts do not “impos[e] their 
views of preferable educational methods upon the states.”390 Given 
that the IDEA governs education—a responsibility traditionally left to 
the states—and that the legislation is silent on the degree of services 
that had to be used, a test that imposes upon the states only when there 
                                                 
384 Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219. 
385 Dep’t of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 345 (1994). 
386 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (stating that a 
statute will be interpreted to pre-empt the traditional state powers only if that result 
is “the clear and manifest purpose of Congress” (quoting Napier v. Atl. Coast Line 
R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926)). 
387 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(2) (2006); see also Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick 
Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183 (1982). 
388 See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
389 Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 277 
(7th Cir. 2007). 
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has been a clear IDEA violation is consistent with the IDEA’s 




 The purpose behind the IDEA is to provide a meaningful 
education for students with disabilities. One component of that 
education is placement in an environment that is conducive to 
instruction. A reasonableness test is more suitable to achieving this 
result because it better accounts for the relevant IDEA language and 
applicable Supreme Court precedent. Factor-based tests, as 
demonstrated, give the judiciary more scrutinizing authority than 
Congress intended. A test that is delicate to determinations that are 
sensitive to the peculiar needs of any individual student with a 
disability is more appropriate than a factor test that rests on a 
presumption of mainstreaming. It is a question of institutional 
competence, and as institutions, courts are better left in the courtroom, 
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